We find evidence of a conflict of interest in combining lending with merger advisory services. That is, when a commercial bank is chosen to advise the acquirer in an acquisition, there is the implicit promise of future lending at preferential, below market terms. The market reacts to this unresolved agency problem by levying an announcement date decrease in the bank's abnormal returns of approximately 36 basis points. This negative announcement effect is not observed for investment bank advisors of acquiring firms.
Conflicts of Interest in Merger Advisory Services
Revelations of conflicts of interest in financial analysts' recommendations have created a crisis of confidence in the trustworthiness of large, complex financial institutions that are subject to the pull of competing interests. Already there are those with second thoughts about the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 that expanded banking powers to include a broad range of banking, securities, underwriting and insurance activities.
1 Adherence to all of the financial conglomerate's many fiduciary responsibilities may, at times, be compromised by the allure of high fees and increased market share. This is particularly the case if the additional fees are booked immediately (say, in the case of lucrative underwriting contracts), but the conflicts only potentially realized at a later date (e.g., in the poor performance of portfolios constructed following stock pickers' recommendations). 2 Moreover, cyclical fluctuations can make it even more difficult to connect the dots of conflicting interests -rising markets hide a multitude of sins and declining markets may reveal spurious connections.
In this paper, we examine the role of financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions. In contrast to previous work by Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani and Saunders (2003) , (hereinafter, AJPS), we focus on the impact of potential conflicts of interest on the financial institution itself, rather than on the merger counterparties. AJPS find that 1 Kanatas and Qi (2003) describe possible conflicts of interest between lending and underwriting and claim that specialized financial intermediaries are more innovative than universal banks. However, Saunders and Stover (2001) find evidence of economies of scope between underwriting and commercial banking when the same bank serves as underwriter and as credit guarantor. 2 Potential conflicts of interest are exacerbated by intra-firm agency conflicts where one division gains at the expense of other divisions. Risk-adjusted internal capital charges, using concepts such as RAROC, may levy a shadow price for these intra-firm conflicts. However, the setting of these capital allocation charges is quite difficult in practice and becomes more difficult the more complex the institution.
commercial banks have a net certification effect in advising target firms, stemming from private information gathered over the course of a prior banking/lending relationship.
That is, since commercial bank lending and other relationships are often long standing and continuous, requiring the ongoing monitoring of the firm's activities, thereby producing private information about the firm's value. The authors find that target firms experience significant positive abnormal returns when they engage their own commercial bank as a financial advisor. However, acquirers experience no such certification gain in hiring their own commercial banks as financial advisors. AJPS also find that acquirers are more likely to use a commercial bank as a financial advisor if they have had a prior lending relationship with the bank. The motivation for this choice is potential access to future financing for the acquirer or for the merged entity. 3 Empirical evidence shows that acquirers expect, and are more likely to receive, future financing from the commercial bank chosen to advise the acquirer in a merger if there has been a prior lending relationship between the bank and acquiring firm. 4 In this paper, we examine the consequences of this choice for the financial advisor.
Tied-in sales, such as the joint offering of financial advice and financing commitments (either explicit or implicit) are not necessarily nefarious. Indeed, one of the primary motivations for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 was the potential 3 This may because the commercial bank advisor has gathered private information about the acquiring during the long term banking relationship, thereby giving the bank cost advantages in monitoring the loan. Benveniste, et al. (2003) find evidence of information advantages in the choice of IPO underwriter. In contrast, Fernando, et al. (2003) show that the issuer chooses an underwriter based on reputation and may switch from IPO to SEO if the quality of the issuer has deteriorated. 4 Although we find evidence of conflicts of interest when the bank combines lending with merger advisory activities, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) find that acquirers earn positive abnormal returns in mergers financed with bank debt.
realization of cost and profit synergies that could be obtained from the cross-selling of financial services resulting from the reusability of information (see Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1986) for a discussion of the reusability of information). 5 However, if for example, the financial advisor underprices the loans extended to the acquirer in order to win lucrative merger advisory business, then the combination of lending and advisory services may be value reducing, rather than value enhancing. 6 This mispricing can persist if there are intra-firm agency conflicts that induce merger advisors to extend implicit promises of discounted future lending so as to maximize advisory fees. That is, the merger advisory department earns credit (say toward the department's P&L) for the fees earned, but does not bear the cost of subsequent loan losses or inappropriately priced loan commitments. This internal agency problem within the commercial bank creates the possibility that loan commitments extended in the course of providing merger advice to acquiring firms may be mispriced and inappropriately structured. Alleviating this would require deducting from the upfront advisory fees the discount inherent in the loan's underpricing. The extent of any persistent conflicts of interest in combining lending with merger advisory services reflects unresolved agency problems within large, complex financial institutions.
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5 For a discussion of the debate regarding possible synergistic benefits from expanding banking powers, see Mester (1992 Mester ( , 1996 and Allen and Jagtiani (2000) . 6 The Economist (January 11, 2003) reports that there is concern that lead banks are underpricing the yields on syndicated bank loans in exchange for investment banking business. 7 As an example, the potential for conflicts of interest was raised in the case of Lehman Brothers, the advisor for Dynegy, the erstwhile acquirer of Enron Corporation in the context of repayment of a $179 million swap transaction. Macey and O'Hara (2003) contend that commercial banks have unique corporate governance problems (due to the existence of the safety net, the high degree of financial leverage and the structure of bank assets/liabilities), thereby preventing the resolution of these agency conflicts. 9 Investment banks may also build lending relationship and obtain private information, for example, in the course of underwriting activities. However, underwriting episodes are discrete and intermittent, corresponding to the relatively short time period surrounding the issue registration, offering period, and after-market support period.
certification of the target firm's value appear to accrue to the target firm only, and not to the target's commercial bank advisor.
Section 2 presents the market return model and describes how we measure the credit/lending explanatory variables used in the regression analysis. Our results are presented in Section 3, and the paper concludes in Section 4.
Methodology
This paper uses the AJPS terminology to identify the credit/lending relationship between bank advisor and merger participants (target and acquirers). 10 A credit/lending relationship exists if the bank has made loans to either merger counterparty at some date prior to the merger announcement date. The precise empirical definition of a credit/lending relationship is presented in Section 3. 11 More than one of these variables could take on the value of one for any given observation. Thus, if TBBT = TBBA = 1 then the target advisor has had prior lending relationships with both target and acquirer.
We then take the cross product term of the four relationship dummy variables (TBBT, TBBA, ABBT and ABBA) multiplied with the two dummy variables indicating whether we are examining the equity returns of the target firm's advisor (ADVT=1) or the acquirer's advisor (ADVA=1). Thus, for example, if TBBA_ADVT=1, the equity returns are those of the target firm's advisor to a deal in which the target's advisor is a commercial bank and the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the acquirer.
Since financial institutions advise many different merger counterparties, it is inappropriate to use the standard event study methodology to determine the merger announcement effect on the advisors' equity returns. Thus, we utilize the regression approach proposed by Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Brown and Warner (1985) .
The return model is defined as follows:
where it R is the daily equity return of financial advisor ( ) i obtained from CRSP over the period was any ambiguity in defining the bank relationship for either the target or the acquirer, we recorded the relationship as missing and the observation was dropped from the analysis. Using this procedure, we constructed the four dummy variables that distinguish among the four possible lending relationships: the target's bank advising the target (TBBT), the acquirer's bank advising the target (TBBA), the target's bank advising the acquirer (ABBT), and the acquirer's bank advising the acquirer (ABBA).
To fill in the gaps and add additional detail to the description of bank relationships, we obtained data on loan syndications from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). If LPC showed that a financial advisor participated in loan syndication in any capacity (i.e., as an agent, arranger, or participant) prior to the merger announcement date, then we recorded that as a prior lending relationship. The LPC database includes 14 Because the SEC does not require firms to reveal specific details about their banking relationships, we could not utilize more detailed data about the nature of the relationship. Data obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation contained more detailed descriptions of the lending relationship. 15 We therefore avoided the problem of recording no relationship for companies that chose not to report any of their banking arrangements. Unless there was a systematic attempt to omit the names of merger advisors from firm disclosures of lending relationships, this should result in an unbiased sample.
description of the role of the lender, the origination date of the loan syndication, and the purpose of the loan, among other descriptive variables. We used these as control variables to analyze the intensity of the lending relationship for the subset of deals that were included in the LPC database. 16 Our sample includes only those firms whose shares were traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We verified the SDC announcement date using the Wall Street Journal, and used the date in the Wall Street Journal whenever there was a discrepancy.
We estimated the market model defined by equation (1) As expected, the market return variable is highly significant, with the average market beta for commercial banks shown as 1.235 in Table 2 . In contrast, the market beta for investment banks averages 1.855. All other control variables are either weakly significant or insignificantly different from zero. The size of the deal, measured here the log market capitalization of the target firm, is positive and statistically significant.
Empirical Results
Presumably, target size is a fairly good proxy of the fee business generated by the merger deal. Table 3 presents the results of the wider regression analysis that incorporates variables that control for the intensity and duration of the prior lending relationships between merger counterparties and financial advisors. None of these additional control variables are significant for investment bank advisors. However, the Lender_TBBT variable is significantly positive (at the 5% level) for commercial bank advisors, consistent with the positive certification effect found by AJPS. That is, abnormal returns are higher when target firm's hire as advisors with whom they have had an informationproducing prior lending relationship. As in Table 2 , the coefficient on the ABBA_ADVA variable is significantly (at the 5% level) negative in the wider regressions shown in Table 3 , consistent with the presence of conflicts of interest for commercial bank advisors of acquiring firms. Moreover, the Source of Funds variable is significantly (at the 10% level) negative for investment bank advisors, suggesting that advisor returns decline when the merger is financed using borrowed funds. This result offers additional support for the conflicts of interest hypothesis resulting from combining borrowing with merger advisory activity.
Conclusion
Our findings demonstrate that the market is concerned about a potential conflict of interest as commercial bank advisors provide lending to acquirers in return for merger advisory fees. The advisor's implicit (or explicit) promise to provide credit is viewed as a potential conflict of interest by the market and weakens any perceived profits resulting from merger advisory fees; i.e., losses on future loan commitments (as well as related adverse reputational effects) may more than offset merger advisory fees. Using the Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. tvalues are in parentheses.
The pooled return generating function was estimated for 20 advisors over the period January 1995 -December 2000 (or whatever subset was relevant for each bank). 11 of the advisors were classified as commercial banks and 9 of the advisors were classified as investment banks. The dependent variable is the percent daily return (including dividends) for each financial advisor.
The independent variables are: Market Index = the CRSP equally weighted index of daily returns (percent).
Source of Funds = 1 if the merger was financed using borrowed funds.
Deal Size = the sum of the log market capitalization of the acquirer and target firms. Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. tvalues are in parentheses.
The pooled return generating function was estimated for 20 advisors over the period January 1995 -December 2000 (or whatever subset was relevant for each bank). 11 of the advisors were classified as commercial banks and 9 of the advisors were classified as investment banks. The dependent variable is the percent daily return (including dividends) for each financial advisor. All variables are as defined in Table 2 .
In addition, the following variable definitions apply to Table 3 :
Lender_TBBT (Lender_ABBT) = 0 if the target firm has no banking relationships with the target (acquirer) advisor; =1 if the target's bank acted as a participant in a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date; =2 if the target's bank acted as an agent or arranger for a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date. Lender_TBBA (Lender_ABBA) = 0 if the acquirer has no banking relationships with the target (acquirer) advisors; =1 if the acquirer's bank acted as a participant in a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date; =2 if the acquirer's bank acted as an agent or arranger for a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date. Duration_TBBT (Duration_ABBT) = the length of time (in years) between the origination of the earliest loan syndication to the target by the target (acquirer) advisor. Duration_TBBA (Duration_ABBA) = the length of time (in years) between the origination of the earliest loan syndication to the acquirer by the target (acquirer) advisor.
Purpose_TBBT (Purpose_ABBT) = 0 if there were no prior loan syndications to the target firm involving the target (acquirer) advisor; =1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the target firm was related to an acquisition; = 2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the target firm was for general business purposes.
